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The Type D Reorganization After 1986:
A Case for Repeal
Kelley Walsh White*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Three Different Types of Distributions
A shareholder generally is required to include part or all of the
value received from a corporation in gross income. The tax conse-
quences of a corporate distribution vary depending upon the distri-
bution's classification. This Article will discuss three types of
distributions.
The first type of distribution is one from an on-going corporation
with respect to a shareholder's stock.' This kind is generally
treated as a dividend to the extent of the corporation's earnings
and profits.2 The full amount of the dividend is included in the
shareholder's gross income and is taxed as ordinary income. This
type of distribution will be referred to throughout this Article as a
"normal dividend distribution."
Another type of distribution is one that is made as a payment in
exchange for the shareholder's stock. This distribution occurs in
liquidation transactions4 and in certain redemption transactions
that involve meaningful reductions in the relative ownership inter-
ests of the shareholders.' This type of distribution is included in
the shareholder's gross income, but the amount of income recog-
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1986. This Article is adapted from a paper prepared for the Senior Tax Seminar con-
ducted by Jeffrey Kwall at Loyola University of Chicago School of Law.
1. See I.R.C. § 301. Unless otherwise indicated, references to sections are to the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended [hereinafter the Code].
2. I.R.C. § 316(a).
3. See I.R.C. § 301(c)(1). If the distribution amount exceeds the amount of the cor-
poration's earnings and profits, the remaining amount is first applied against the share-
holder's stock basis, and any amount in excess of the stock basis is treated as a gain from
the sale or exchange of property. I.R.C. § 301(c)(2)-(3).
4. See I.R.C. § 331(a). Section 331(a) provides that "[a]mounts received by a share-
holder in a distribution in complete liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as in full
payment in exchange for the stock." I.R.C. § 331(a).
5. See I.R.C. §§ 302(b), 317(b). Under section 317(b), stock is treated as redeemed
by a corporation "if the corporation acquires its stock from a shareholder in exchange for
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nized is limited to the gain realized in the exchange transaction.6
Any resulting gain is characterized as a capital gain rather than as
ordinary income.7 This type of distribution will be referred to
throughout this Article as an "exchange distribution."
A third type of distribution is a distribution of cash or other
property that is made in connection with a corporate reorganiza-
tion.' This type of distribution will be referred to throughout this
Article as a "boot distribution." 9 The tax treatment of a boot dis-
tribution is much like that of an exchange distribution because the
amount of income recognized is limited by the shareholder's
amount of realized gain (hereinafter referred to as a "dividend
within gain limitation").10 The difference between the boot distri-
property, whether or not the stock so acquired is cancelled, retired, or held as treasury
stock." I.R.C. § 317(b).
6. I.R.C. §§ 302(a), 331(a).
7. See I.R.C. §§ 331(a), 1012 and 1221(a). The Tax Reform Act of 1986 essentially
eliminated the preferential treatment of capital gains by rewriting section 1202. Tax Re-
form Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 205 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Act]. Prior
to 1986, section 1202 allowed individuals to deduct 60% of net capital gains from gross
income. Because the maximum tax rate at the time was 50%, the deduction meant that
net capital gain was taxed at a maximum rate of 20% (i.e. 40% x 50%). Today, the
characterization of income as capital gain is still relevant but only when the taxpayer uses
a capital loss to offset the capital gain. See I.R.C. § 1211 (a). Thus, if a shareholder has
significant capital losses, classifying the distribution as a liquidation or as a redemption
involving a significant reduction in interest allows the taxpayer to offset those losses
against the capital gain realized in the distribution. For further discussion of the 1986
Act, see infra notes 94-131 and accompanying text.
8. The corporate reorganization provisions, set forth in section 368, define certain
transactions that may fall within the corresponding nonrecognition rules of sections 354,
355 and 361. There are six different types of these transactions defined in the Code; all
include stock as the consideration used in the transactions. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A)-(G).
A reorganization may take the following forms: a statutory merger (§ 368(a)(l)(A)); a
stock purchase (§ 368(a)(1)(B)); an asset acquisition (§ 368(a)(1)(C) or (D)); a divisive
transaction (§ 368(a)(1)(D)); a recapitalization (§ 368(a)(l)(E)); or a "mere change in
identity, form or place of one corporation" (§ 368(a)(1)(F)). These transactions are com-
monly referred to by their subsection designations ((A)-(G)). Cash and/or other prop-
erty may be included as part of the consideration used in.all of these transactions except
the type (B) reorganization (§ 368(a)(1)(B)), but the cash and/or other property that is
distributed is treated as "boot." See I.R.C. § 356(a). In the reorganizations that permit
boot to be used as part of the consideration, the boot is subject in part to taxation under
section 356. See infra note 10.
9. I.R.C. § 356. "Boot" consists of additional consideration in the form of a cash
payment or other property that accompanies an exchange or transaction.
10. I.R.C. § 356(a)(1). Section 356(a) provides that
[i]f section 354 or 355 would apply to an exchange but for the fact that the
property received in the exchange consists not only of property permitted by
section 354 or 355 to be received without the recognition of gain but also of
other property or money, then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recog-
nized, but in an amount not in excess of the sum of such money and the fair
market value of such other property.
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bution and the exchange distribution, however, is that the income
received in a boot distribution usually is taxed as ordinary income
like the normal dividend distribution. The income received in the
exchange distribution is treated as a capital gain.'I This type of
distribution will be referred to throughout this Article as a "boot
distribution."
B. The Liquidation/Reincorporation Transaction
The amount of income included in a shareholder's gross income
and the characterization of that income will vary depending on
how a particular distribution is classified. Before the enactment of
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, major disputes arose when sharehold-
ers attempted to structure transactions involving a distribution of a
corporation's assets (usually a liquidation) as exchange transac-
tions in order to take advantage of the preferential tax treatment
afforded to exchange distributions. The shareholders would keep
only the liquid assets and would reincorporate the operating assets
to continue the operation of the business.' 2 This transaction is re-
ferred to herein as a "liquidation/reincorporation" transaction.
Substantively, the distributions appeared to be normal dividend
distributions. Essentially, the shareholders extracted the earnings
Id. at § 356(a). This section, which provides a dividend within gain limitation, operates
to limit the amount of income recognized in the same way section 336(a) limits the
amount of income recognized in liquidating distributions. Id. See infra note 25 and ac-
companying text.
11. Section 356(a)(2) governs the characterization of the income in a boot distribu-
tion. I.R.C. § 356(a)(2). This section characterizes the income as ordinary income if the
distribution has the effect of a dividend and the corporation that made the distribution
has sufficient earnings and profits to cover the amount of the dividend. Id. The section
302 redemption rules are used to determine whether the distribution has the effect of a
dividend. Section 302 generally requires a reduction in a shareholder's proprietary inter-
est before permitting exchange treatment. Id. at § 302(b). Dividend equivalence is not
automatic, but generally it will apply in a transaction designed as a liquidation followed
by a reincorporation. In those cases, there probably will be no change in the share-
holder's proprietary interest. See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. If the distri-
bution does not have the effect of a dividend, however, it will be characterized as a capital
gain like the liquidating distribution. I.R.C. § 356(a)(2). In the Supreme Court's most
recent pronouncement on section 356, the Court held that the effect of the exchange as a
whole must be examined in order to determine whether an exchange has the effect of a
didvidend distribution under section 356(a)(2). Commissioner v. Clark, 109 S. Ct. 1455,
1462 (1989). The Court further concluded that the redemption tests of section 302
should be applied after the reorganization has occurred because this approach acknowl-
edges that there would have been no cash payment absent the exchange. By accepting the
cash payment, the taxpayer experienced a meaningful reduction in potential ownership
interest. Id.
12. For a discussion of the different forms of the liquidation/reincorporation transac-
tion, see infra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
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out of the business, which enabled them to avoid the dividend dis-
tribution rules and continue the business of the corporation as
before. When challenged, shareholders argued that, because these
transactions qualified formally as exchanges, the distributions
should be treated like exchange distributions.
By treating distributions as exchange distributions, rather than
as dividend distributions, the shareholder's stock basis could offset
the amount of income. A dividend distribution could not receive
similar treatment. 3 In addition, the exchange distribution quali-
fied for the capital gain deduction although the dividend distribu-
tion did not. " The final benefit provided by the exchange
distribution was at the corporate level. The reincorporated assets
received a stepped-up basis.' 5 Along with this basis came the po-
tential to generate additional tax savings from future depreciation
deductions. 16
The government perceived this liquidation/reincorporation
transaction as an abusive tax avoidance method and attempted to
combat the abuses associated with the transaction. 17 Because the
appearance of the transaction closely resembled a dividend distri-
bution, the government could have logically argued that the distri-
butions were subject to the normal dividend distribution rules of
section 301.18 In some cases, the government attempted to use this
13. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
14. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
15. Section 362(b) provides in part: "If property was acquired by a corporation in
connection with a reorganization to which this part applies, then the basis shall be the
same as it would be in the hands of the transferor, increased in the amount of gain recog-
nized to the transferor on such transfer." I.R.C. § 362 (b).
16. See I.R.C. § 167(a). This result was extremely beneficial prior to 1986 because
the step-up in the basis of the corporate assets was allowed even though no corporate
level tax was imposed on the liquidation of the assets. See I.R.C. § 336 (1954). See also
infra note 44 and accompanying text.
17. This topic has been discussed by several different commentators. See generally,
Krasner, Liquidation/Reincorporation After the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 24 WILLAM-
ETTE L. REV. 885 (1988); Mentz, Reincorporation-At Long Last a Legislative Response,
43rd N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX pt. 1, § 4 (1985); Nunnallee, The "Liquidation-
Reincorporation " Doctrine Revisited After The Tax Reform Act of 1984: Do Sections 302
and 304 Provide The Solution?, 40 TAX LAWYER 1 (1986); Westin, In Like A Lion And
Out Like A Lamb: The 98th Congress And The Liquidation-Reincorporation Abuse, 42
TAX NOTES 997 (1989).
18. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. Because the corporation never really
ceases operations in these types of transactions, the government could have argued that,
in substance, a liquidation never occurred. In fact, the legislative history indicates that
section 331 is an exception to the normal dividend distribution rules of section 301 and
that it is intended only to apply in situations when a business has been partially or com-
pletely liquidated. See S. REP. No. 39, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1924); See also Wes-
tin, supra note 17, at 1007.
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exact argument. 19 Perhaps because the language in the liquidation
provision states expressly that normal dividend rules are not appli-
cable to liquidation transactions,2" the courts did not widely accept
the government's argument. Rather, courts took the position that
the distributions in the liquidation/reincorporation transaction had
to be taxed outside the normal dividend rules even though, sub-
stantively, the distributions looked more like normal dividend dis-
tributions than exchange distributions.2' The government,
therefore, resorted to an alternative argument to attack the liquida-
tion/reincorporation transactions.22
C. Treatment as a Reorganization
The government argued that the liquidation/reincorporation
transaction constituted a corporate reorganization. 23  This ap-
proach allowed the government to characterize the income re-
ceived in the distribution as ordinary income rather than as capital
19. See Breech v. United States, 439 F.2d 409, 411 (9th Cir. 1971); Davant v. Com-
missioner, 366 F.2d 874, 889-90 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967) (ap-
plying § 301 to the distribution after finding that the distribution was unrelated to the
transaction); Estate of Lammerts, 54 T.C. 420, 439 (1970); Gallagher v. Commissioner,
39 T.C. 144, 163 (1962) (court held that the transaction could only be analyzed under the
reorganization provisions, rejecting the government's argument that no liquidation took
place), acq. in result 1964-2 C.B. 5. See also Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961-2 C.B. 62 (applying
Treas. Reg § 1.331-1(c) and § 1.301-1(1) and finding the distribution taxable as a divi-
dend under § 301).
20. See I.R.C. § 331(b). Section 331(b) provides that "[s]ection 301 . . . shall not
apply to any distribution of property . . . in complete liquidation." I.R.C. § 331(b).
21. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
22. The only rules from subchapter C that could apply were the liquidation rules in
section 33 1, the redemption rules in section 302 or the reorganization rules in section 368.
For some unknown reason, the courts more willingly accepted the application of the
reorganization rules than the liquidation or redemption rules. The government did at-
tempt to apply the redemption rules in at least one case, but a closely divided court
rejected this argument. See Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 144, 163 (1962). The
courts' strict adherence to the language in sections 301 and 302 and consequent refusal to
recast the liquidation/reincorporation as a dividend or redemption is inexplicable. With
regard to the reorganization definitions, courts have refused to give equally specific lan-
guage a literal interpretation. See Hjorth, Liquidations and Reincorporations-Before and
After Davant, 42 WASH. L. REV. 737, 740 (1967) (discussing how courts willingly applied
the reorganization definitions even in situations in which the transactions involved did
not literally conform to the definitions, while refusing to apply section 301 unless there
was literal compliance with the language in the statute).
23. Liddon v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 304, 309 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824
(1956); Bard-Parker Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 52, 58 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 906 (1955); Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 650 (1st Cir. 1949); Survaunt
v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753, 758-59 (8th Cir. 1947), aff'g 5 T.C. 665 (1945); James
Armour, Inc. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 295, 309-10 (1964).
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gain. 24 The amount of income subject to tax, however, remained
the same as in an exchange distribution because section 356(a) con-
tains a "dividend within gain limitation" that limits the amount of
income recognized by the shareholders to the amount of gain real-
ized in the distribution transaction .2  This approach at least al-
lowed the government to win the characterization battle, although
the shareholder was able to avoid including the full amount of the
distribution in gross income. Because the reorganization provi-
sions allowed the government to attack the characterization of the
income in the distribution, the government gained some leverage to
combat the liquidation/reincorporation device.
The most successful government argument was based on the
type (D) reorganization.26 Although many of the courts accepted
this argument,27 there were significant problems associated with
using this type of a provision to alleviate the abuses associated with
the liquidation/reincorporation transaction. The problems arose
because the reorganization provisions were never intended to be
used as a weapon against taxpayers.2  As a result, the analysis did
24. All distributions are classified as boot distributions subject to tax under section
356.
25. See I.R.C. § 356(a)(1). Section 356 in the 1954 Code and its predecessor section
112(c) in the 1939 Code contained the dividend within gain limitation that exists today
under section 356.
26. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D). Section 368(a)(1)(D) defines a (D) reorganization as
a transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to another corporation if
immediately after the transfer the transferor, or one or more of its shareholders
... or any combination thereof, is in control of the corporation to which the
assets are transferred; but only if, in pursuance of the plan, stock or securities of
the corporation to which the assets are transferred are distributed in a transac-
tion which qualifies under section 354, 355, or 356.
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D).
The government also used the type (E) and (F) reorganization provisions in this con-
text. Section 368(a)(1)(E) defines the type (E) reorganization as a "recapitalization." Id.
at § 368(a)(l)(E). The government used this provision in Revenue Ruling 61-156, 1961-2
C.B. 62, but no case law supports this argument, and no court has ever accepted using the
type (E) provision in the liquidation/reincorporation context. See Mentz, supra note 17,
at § 4. Section 368(a)(1)(F) defines the type (F) reorganization as "a mere change in
identity, form or place of organization of one corporation, however effected." I.R.C.
§ 368(a)(l)(F). This provision was more widely accepted by the courts, but The Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Tax Act of 1982 amended the definition of the type (F)
reorganization so that it applies only to transactions involving one entity. Thus, the type
(F) provision can no longer be used because the liquidation/reincorporation transaction
involves two corporations. See Westin, supra note 17, at 1000.
27. See Hjorth, supra note 22, at 745; see also Nicholson, 335-2nd T.M. Liquidation-
Reincorporation (1989).
28. See H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1924); S. REP. No. 398, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1924) (discussion indicated that the purpose behind the reorgani-
zation provisions was to provide relief to taxpayers in transactions where no economic
gain was actually realized).
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not adequately address all of the abuses involved in the liquida-
tion/reincorporation transaction. Specifically, the reorganization
provisiQns did not provide for the more sensible result; that is, in-
clusion of the full amount of the liquid assets retained by the share-
holders in their gross income.
Not until the Tax Reform Act of 1986 was there finally an im-
pact on the abuses associated with the liquidation/reincorporation
transaction. 29 Two changes, the repeal of the capital gains deduc-
tion3 ° and the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine, 3' signifi-
cantly reduced the potential for abuse in the liquidation/
reincorporation context. In certain limited circumstances, the liq-
uidation/reincorporation transaction can still be used as a means
to withdraw liquid assets and to avoid the normal dividend distri-
bution rules of section 301.32 The abuses that remain today, how-
ever, will no longer be attacked under the (D) reorganization
provision. Treatment under section (D) yields the same or even
better tax results for the taxpayer in most of the instances in which
the liquidation/reincorporation transaction can still be used to cir-
cumvent the normal dividend rules.33
This Article discusses how the 1986 Act's changes affected the
abuses associated with the liquidation/reincorporation transaction
and how these changes reduced the continued usefulness of the (D)
reorganization provision as a weapon against the abuses that re-
main. Part II outlines the specific steps and goals associated with
the liquidation/reincorporation transaction,34 and Part III dis-
cusses the historical problems associated with utilizing the (D) re-
organization provision as a weapon against this type of
transaction. 35
Part IV argues that the 1986 Act no longer allows the (D) reor-
ganization provision to function as an effective weapon against the
remaining problems associated with the liquidation/reincorpora-
tion transaction. 36 The focus of Part V is that the (D) reorganiza-
tion provision is no longer necessary to reach the transaction it
29. See infra notes 94-131 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text. Neither the repeal of the capital
gains deduction nor the repeal of General Utilities doctrine were aimed specifically at the
liquidation/reincorporation transaction. For a description of the General Utilities doc-
trine, see infra note 41.
32. See infra notes 108-31.
33. Id.
34. See infra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 49-93 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 94-131 and accompanying text.
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originally was intended to reach and now exists only as a provision
to be used by the taxpayer for tax avoidance purposes.37 Based
upon this analysis, this Article proposes that the (D) reorganiza-
tion provision should be repealed.
II. STRUCTURES AND TAX CONSEQUENCES OF THE
LIQUIDATION/REINCORPORATION TRANSACTION
The liquidation/reincorporation transaction structures vary in
order to avoid treatment of the transaction as a normal dividend
distribution or as a boot dividend distribution. This section of the
Article describes the transaction's two most common forms.38
A. A Liquidation Followed by a Reincorporation
Before 1986, two types of liquidation/reincorporation transac-
tions allowed shareholders to extract the earnings from a corpora-
tion without being subject to the dividend distribution rules.39 In
the first form, one corporation completely liquidated and distrib-
uted all of its assets, including its operating assets, to its sharehold-
ers. The shareholders realized a capital gain on this distribution
measured by the difference between the fair market value of the
assets distributed and the adjusted basis in their stock." Although
a tax was imposed on the shareholder level gain, historically the
corporate level gain was afforded non-recognition treatment.',
Following the liquidation, the shareholders transferred the oper-
ating assets into a newly formed corporation controlled by them.
This reincorporation transaction did not increase the tax burden of
the overall transaction because any gain realized by the sharehold-
ers in the reincorporation transaction was not recognized.4 2 The
newly formed corporation received similar non-recognition treat-
37. See infra notes 132-49 and accompanying text.
38. See generally Hjorth, supra note 22; Mentz, supra note 17.
39. For a discussion of the dividend distribution rules, see supra text accompanying
notes 1-3.
40. I.R.C. § 331(a).
41. See I.R.C. § 336(a) (1954). The nonrecognition rule for corporate level gain after
a distribution of appreciated property, commonly known as the General Utilities doctrine,
was based on General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935). This
rule was applied statutorily to liquidating and non-liquidating distributions prior to 1987.
See I.R.C. §§ 336(a), 311(b) (1954). Today section 336(a) imposes a corporate level tax
on the corporate gain realized in a liquidation transaction. The gain is measured by the
difference between the fair market value of the assets distributed and the corporation's
adjusted basis in the assets. I.R.C. § 336(a). For a further discussion of the General
Utilities doctrine, see infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
42. See I.R.C. § 351(a). Section 351(a) permits nonrecognition of gain "if property is
transferred to a corporation by one or more persons solely in exchange for stock or secur-
[Vol. 21
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ment on the reincorporation of the assets.43
Overall, the transactions enabled the shareholders to continue
the operation of their business in the form of a newly created cor-
poration and to extract the liquid assets from the business at a cap-
ital gain cost. In addition, the corporate assets received a free step-
up in basis because no corporate level tax was imposed in the liqui-
dation transaction." The extra basis in the corporate assets could
then be used in the future to generate additional depreciation
deductions.
By contrast, if the operating assets were left in corporate solu-
tion and the corporation simply distributed the liquid assets as a
normal dividend distribution to the shareholders, the full amount
of the distribution would be included in the shareholders' gross
income and would be taxed as ordinary income rather than as a
capital gain.45 The assets not distributed to the shareholders would
not receive a step-up in basis.
B. A Sale of Assets Followed by a Liquidation
The second form of the liquidation/reincorporation transaction
was similar in effect to the first, but it reversed the steps of the
transaction. In this form, the first corporation would sell its oper-
ating assets to another corporation controlled by the same share-
holders. Following this sale, the transferor corporation would
distribute the proceeds from the sale, along with the other liquid
assets retained, to the shareholders of the first corporation under a
plan of complete liquidation.
This second scenario produced the same favorable tax treatment
for the shareholders. Only the capital gain realized by the share-
holders in the liquidation transaction was taxed.46 The corporate
level gain realized from the sale of assets received nonrecognition
treatment under old section 337 because a complete liquidation of
ities in such corporation and immediately after the exchange such person or persons are
in control ...." I.R.C. § 351(a).
43. See I.R.C. § 1032(a). Section 1032(a) permits nonrecognition to a corporation
"on the receipt of money or other property in exchange for stock .. .of such corpora-
tion." I.R.C. § 1032(a).
44. See I.R.C. § 362(a)(1). The liquidation itself created no corporate level tax. The
recapture rules in sections 1245 and 1250, however, had the potential to trigger some tax
consequences for depreciation recapture. The shareholders received a step-up in the basis
of the assets because they recognized gain in the liquidation transaction. See I.R.C.
§ 334(a). Upon reincorporation, the corporation took a transferred basis in the assets.
I.R.C. § 362(a).
45. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
46. I.R.C. § 331(a).
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the transferor corporation followed it.47
Again, the overall effect of this transaction allowed shareholders
of the transferor corporation to continue their business in the form
of a new corporation and, at the same time, to withdraw the accu-
mulated earnings and profits of the business. They paid only a
shareholder level tax at a preferential capital gain rate. In addi-
tion, the corporate assets also received a free step-up in basis even
though no corporate level tax was imposed on the sale of the as-
sets.48 Further depreciation deductions then could flow from the
increased basis in the assets to generate additional tax savings in
the future.
III. CLASSIFICATION AS A (D) REORGANIZATION
A. Background
The liquidation/reincorporation transaction began to evolve as
early as the 1940s.4 9 Nevertheless, the law in effect at the time did
not contain provisions to deal with the liquidation/reincorporation
transaction. Consequently, the government was forced to begin
combatting these abusive transactions by resorting to other provi-
sions in the Code." The argument based on the reorganization
provisions, the (D) reorganization provision in particular, proved
most successful.-' The government still uses this argument today
because Congress has never enacted a provision to deal specifically
with the liquidation/reincorporation transaction.2 The reorgani-
47. I.R.C. § 337(a) (1954). Section 337(a) provided:
If within the 12-month period beginning on the date on which a corporation
adopts a plan of complete liquidation, all of the assets of the corporation are
distributed in complete liquidation, less assets retained to meet claims, then no
gain or loss shall be recognized to such corporationfrom the sale or exchange
by it of property within such 12-month period.
Id.
48. See I.R.C. § 1012.
49. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS, 14.54 (5th ed. 1987). See also Bakst, Does Dissolution Followed
by Reincorporation Constitute a Reorganization?, 33 TAXES 815 (1955).
50. See supra note 22.
51. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
52. In 1954 the House proposed a Code section to deal with the liquidation/
reincorporation abuses, but it was only designed to deal with the situation in which a
liquidating corporation transfers assets to its shareholders who in turn transfer the assets
to a controlled corporation. The section did not address any other forms of the transac-
tion. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1954). It was later dropped in
conference with the statement: "It is the belief ... that, at the present time, the possibility
of tax avoidance in this area is not sufficiently serious to require a special statutory provi-
sion," and these questions "can appropriately be disposed of by judicial decision or by
regulation within the framework ... of the bill." See CONF. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong.,
[Vol. 21
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zation provisions include rules that allow both corporations 53 and
shareholders54 to avoid immediate taxation in certain specifically
defined acquisitive and divisive transactions." The shareholders
generally receive nonrecognition treatment, however, only when
they receive stock.56 If they receive other property or cash, as well
as stock in a reorganization transaction, then the non-stock consid-
eration is generally treated as a boot distribution and is taxable to
the extent of the gain realized in the exchange transaction.5 7
The redemption rules of section 302 now determine the charac-
terization of the boot distribution. 58 When the reorganization pro-
visions were first used to attack liquidation/reincorporation
transactions, an automatic dividend rule was in effect, and boot
distributions of cash or other property automatically were charac-
2d Sess. 41 (1954). Since that time, no other independent provisions have been enacted.
The one change made by the 1954 Code that affected the liquidation/reincorporation
transaction was the addition of section 354(b). This section required that substantially all
of the transferor's assets be transferred in the liquidation/reincorporation transaction for
it to qualify as a non-divisive (D) reorganization. See I.R.C. § 354(b). Essentially, sec-
tion 354(b) took divisive transactions out of the scope of section 354. This change actu-
ally was made to protect the integrity of section 355, the provision that specifically dealt
with nonrecognition at the shareholder level after a divisive transaction. The change
unintentionally made it more difficult for the government to apply the reorganization
provision to liquidation/reincorporation transactions. Eventually, the government used
its ingenuity to get around the literal requirement of "substantially all." See B. BITTKER
& J. EUSTICE, supra note 49, at 14.16. See also infra note 76 and accompanying text.
53. Section 361(a) provides for nonrecognition at the corporate level after a reorgani-
zation: "No gain or loss shall be recognized to a corporation if such corporation is a
party to a reorganization and exchanges property in pursuance of the plan of reorganiza-
tion solely for stock or securities in another corporation a party to the reorganization."
I.R.C § 361(a). If the corporation receives non-stock consideration, any gain is recog-
nized unless "the corporation receiving such other property or money distributes it in
pursuance of the plan of reorganization .... Id. at § 361(b)(5)(A).
54. Section 354(a)(1) permits nonrecognition of a shareholder level realized gain after
an acquisitive reorganization: "No gain or loss shall be recognized if stock or securities in
a corporation a party to a reorganization are, in pursuance of the plan of reorganization,
exchanged solely for stock or securities in such corporation or in another corporation a
party to the reorganization." Id. at § 354(a)(1).
Section 355(a)(1) contains a similar nonrecognition allowance after a divisive transac-
tion: "If a corporation . . . distributes to a shareholder, with respect to its stock, or
distributes to a security holder, in exchange for its securities, solely stock or securities of a
corporation... which it controls immediately before the distribution... then no gain or
loss shall be recognized .... " Id. at 355(a)(1). Note that nonrecognition is available
under section 355 even when the distribution is not made pursuant to reorganization
(within the meaning of section 368(a)(1)(D)). See id. at § 355(a)(2)(C). See also infra
note 146.
55. See I.R.C. 368(a)(l)(A)-(G). See also supra note 7.
56. See supra note 5.
57. See supra notes 8-10.
58. See supra note 11.
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terized as ordinary income. 59 Consequently, if the government
succeded in classifying the liquidation/reincorporation as a reor-
ganization, the distribution of assets was automatically treated as
ordinary income rather than as capital gain. 6° The shareholder's
amount of realized gain in the liquidation part of the transaction
still limited the amount of income subject to tax, but the income
characterization was the same as the dividend income
characterization.
B. Technical Dificulties
To classify the liquidation/reincorporation transaction as a reor-
ganization, the government had to satisfy both the literal require-
ments of the statute as well as the judicial common law doctrines
that evolved in conjunction with the reorganization provisions of
the Code. 6' Therefore, although the transaction may have fallen
within the literal requirements of the (D) reorganization provi-
sions, the common law requirements still had to be met to tax the
shareholder under section 356. As previously noted, the govern-
ment met with much success utilizing the (D) reorganization
provision.62
The 1939 Code defined the type (D) reorganization as "a trans-
fer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to another corpora-
tion if immediately after the transfer the transferor or its
shareholders or both are in control of the corporation to which the
59. The early cases suggested that the boot distribution was automatically character-
ized as ordinary income. See Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945).
In establishing the automatic dividend rule, the Bedford Court held that a "distribution,
pursuant to a reorganization, of earnings and profits has the effect of a distribution of a
taxable dividend .. " Id. at 292. Therefore, dividend treatment was immediately trig-
gered if the distributing corporation had earnings and profits at the time of the distribu-
tion. Later cases, however, used the standards of section 302 relating to redemptions to
determine the character of the boot dividend. See Wright v. United States, 482 F.2d 600,
610 (8th Cir. 1973) (promissory note received by a taxpayer in connection with a corpo-
rate reorganization was not equivalent to a dividend). See also supra note 11.
60. Characterization was the center of the dispute because capital gains were taxed at
a much lower rate prior to 1986. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
61. Historically, the courts have required reorganization transactions to satisfy three
judicial doctrines: the business purpose requirement, the continuity of proprietary interest
requirement, and the continuity of business enterprise requirement. The business pur-
pose requirement originated in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935), and the
continuity of proprietary interest requirement developed in Cortland Specialty Co. v.
Commissioner, 60 F.2d 937, 939-40 (2nd Cir. 1932). The origin of the business enterprise
requirement, on the other hand, is not really known; it appeared prior to the 1954 Code.
See Lynch, The Role of The Continuity of Business Enterprise Requirement in Liquida-
tion-Reincorporation 35 TAX LAWYER 737 (1982). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b)-(d)
(1987).
62. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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assets are transferred."6 3 When drafted, this provision was not in-
tended to apply to a liquidation/reincorporation transaction. 6 4
Not surprisingly, there were several difficulties associated with ap-
plying the statute to this type of a transaction. These difficulties
continued even after the passage of the 1954 Code because the one
relevant change made by the 1954 Code aimed to protect the integ-
rity of the divisive type of transaction, rather than to address the
liquidation/reincorporation transaction.65
1. The Transfer of Assets Requirement
The transfer of assets statutory requirement presented the first
difficulty with fitting the liquidation/reincorporation transaction
within the (D) reorganization provision. To qualify as a (D) reor-
ganization, there must be a transfer of part of the assets of one
corporation to another corporation. 66 If structured as a classic liq-
uidation/reincorporation with the liquidation occurring first, and
with the shareholders then responsible for transferring the assets to
the new corporation, then the transaction did not satisfy the stat-
ute's literal language. 61 In most situations, the reorganization pro-
vision would not apply. Strict adherence to the statutory
prescription in the reorganization provisions has always been the
rule rather than the exception. 61 In the liquidation/reincorpora-
tion context, however, when the government argued for reorgani-
zation treatment, a more liberal interpretation of the language in
the statute prevailed.69
To convince the courts that the liquidation/reincorporation
63. I.R.C. § 112(g)(1)(D) (1939). Cf supra note 25.
64. The 1924 set forth the first (D) reorganization provision, and the legislative his-
tory indicates that the provision's purpose was to provide reorganization treatment for
divisive transactions. See H. R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1924); S. REP.
No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1924); 65 Cong. Rec. 2429 (statement of Represen-
tative Green). The provision remained the same in the 1939 Code but was recodified to
section 112(g)(1).
65. See infra text accompanying note 75.
66. I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D).
67. If structured as a sale of assets followed by a liquidation of the transferor, the
liquidation/reincorporation transaction fell within the literal language of the statute.
Problems arose with respect to fitting the transaction within the literal language of the
statute only when the transaction was structured in various other forms such as the one
outlined in the text.
68. See Treas. Reg. 1.368-1(b) (1987). See also Westin, supra note 17, at 1003 (dis-
cussing as early as 1924 the Congressional mandate for strict adherence to the reorgani-
zation statutes). This philosophy accords with the general belief that tax relief
provisions, such as nonrecognition provisions, should be strictly construed against the
taxpayer.
69. See supra note 61.
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transaction should be recast as a type (D) reorganization, the gov-
ernment argued that the series of steps in the liquidation/
reincorporation transaction were part of an integrated plan. Under
the "step transaction" doctrine, as it was known, courts assessed
the entire transaction at the beginning and at the end, taking into
account the objectives to be accomplished and the means employed
to accomplish the objectives. 0 This approach allowed the courts
to collapse the separate steps of the transaction into one step so
that it appeared as though the transferor corporation actually
transferred the assets to the corporation controlled by the same
shareholders. The step transaction aimed to prevent taxpayers
from recasting clearly taxable transactions into a series of non-tax-
able transactions. Most courts accepted the doctrine and allowed
the transaction to be analyzed under the (D) reorganization provi-
sion even though the actual transaction did not fit within the literal
language of the statute.7
2. The Substantially All Requirement And Continuity of
Business Enterprise
The "substantially all" requirement, added by the 1954 Code,
posed the second problem associated with the application of the
(D) reorganization provision in the liquidation/reincorporation
context.72 This requirement, contained in section 354(b), provided
that the transferor corporation must transfer substantially all of its
assets to the transferee corporation to qualify as a non-divisive (D)
reorganization.73
The purpose of the substantially all requirement was to with-
draw beneficial reorganization treatment from transactions that
Congress believed involved true economic gain.7 4 Congress in-
70. Nicholson, 335-2nd T.M., Liquidation-Reincorporation at A-3 (1989) (citing, Hel-
ler v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 371 (1943), aff'd, 147 F.2d 376 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 325
U.S. 868 (1945)).
71. See Liddon v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 304, 309 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
824 (1956); Bard-Parker Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 52, 58 (2nd Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 906 (1955); Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753, 758-59 (8th Cir.
1947), aff'g 5 T.C. 665 (1947); Lesser v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 306, 312-14 (1956);
Pebble Springs Distilling Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 196, 201-02 (1954), aff'd, 231
F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 836 (1956); Heller v. Commissioner, 2
T.C. 371, 383-84 (1943), aff'd, 147 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868
(1945). The cases that refused to apply the doctrine include, United States v. Arcade Co.,
203 F.2d 230, 235 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 828 (1953) and Henricksen v. Braicks,
137 F.2d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 1943).
72. I.R.C. § 354(b) (1954).
73. Id.
74. Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35, 40 (4th Cir. 1965).
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tended the requirement to prevent a circumvention of section 355,
which specifically dealt with divisive transactions. It also uninten-
tionally reduced the effectiveness of the (D) provision as a weapon
to attack the liquidation/reincorporation transactions. 75 The sub-
stantially all requirement's ultimate effect was insignificant because
again the courts allowed the government to avoid the literal mean-
ing of the statutory language. The courts held almost unanimously
that the requirement applied only to the actual operating assets of
the business.76
Satisfaction of the statutory requirement, however, did not end
the court's inquiry because an independent common law require-
ment had to be satisfied as well. The continuity of business enter-
prise requirement mandates that a significant portion of the
transferor's assets be transferred to and used by the transferee cor-
poration. 77 Although essentially the same as the statutory substan-
tially all requirement, the courts have held that the two
requirements are separate.78 The Ninth Circuit stated that the
common law requirement does not apply at all when the reorgani-
zation provisions are applied to a liquidation/reincorporation
transaction. 79 According to the court, the focus should instead be
restricted to the technical requirements of the reorganization
provisions.80
Thus, this independent common law requirement is not a signifi-
cant obstacle to application of the reorganization provisions to a
liquidation/reincorporation transaction. The lenient approach
with respect to this common law requirement's application, how-
ever, injects an element of uncertainty into the reorganization anal-
ysis as a whole because this approach does not apply outside of the
75. See B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 49, at 14.16. See also supra note 52.
76. See Smothers v. United States, 642 F.2d 894, 900-01 (5th Cir. 1981) (15% of net
worth transferred satisfied substantially all requirement); Moffat v. Commissioner, 42
T.C. 558, 578-81 (1964), aff'd, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966) (finding that "substantially
all" refers to operating assets); James Armour, Inc. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 295, 309
(1964) (the substantially all requirement was met even though only 51% of the total
assets were transferred to the transferee corporation).
77. See Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 860, 871 (3d. Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 836 (1980); Lewis V. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 650 (1st Cir. 1949).
78. See Lynch, supra note 61, at 761. See also Workman v. Commissioner, 46
T.C.M. (P-H) 77, 378 (1977).
79. Rose v. United States, 640 F.2d 1030, 1036, n.11 (9th Cir. 1981), aff'g 1979-
1USTC P 9194, 43 AFTR 2d 79-454 (W.D. Wash. 1978). This statement was merely
dictum because the issue was not litigated. But see Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 614
F.2d 860, 866 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980) (both statutory and nonstatu-
tory requirements apply).
80. Rose, 640 F.2d at 1036 n. 11; Lynch, supra note 61, at 738.
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liquidation/reincorporation context.8'
3. The Control Requirement And Continuity of Interest
The statutory control requirement, included in the definition of a
(D) reorganization, posed the third problem that often arose in ap-
plying the reorganization provision to a liquidation/reincorpora-
tion transaction. Prior to 1984, the control requirement provided
that, after the transfer of assets, the shareholders or the transferor
corporation, or any combination thereof, had to own at least eighty
percent of the combined voting power of all classes of stock enti-
tled to vote and at least eighty percent of the total number of
shares of all other classes of stock.8 2
This requirement caused difficulty for the government because
the courts interpreted statutory control strictly.8 3 Problems arose
because shareholders would structure a liquidation/reincorpora-
tion transaction so that, after the reincorporation, the original
stockholders and the transferor corporation owned slightly less
than the 80% required by the statute. 84 By structuring the transac-
tion this way, the shareholders could avoid reorganization treat-
ment to achieve essentially the same benefits of a liquidation/
reincorporation.
In 1984, Congress amended the definition of control for a non-
divisive (D) reorganization to reduce the control requirement from
eighty percent to fifty percent and to permit the use of the attribu-
tion rules to satisfy this requirement.8 5 Congress specifically in-
81. Lynch, supra note 61, at 738.
82. I.R.C. § 368(c) (1954).
83. See Krasner, supra note 17, at 894-95.
84. See, e.g., Breech v. United States, 439 F.2d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1971) (court found
no (D) reorganization because former shareholders of the transferor corporation owned
20% of the new corporation, and a corporation which was in turn 75% owned by the
shareholders of the transferor corporation owned the remaining 80%); Berghash v. Com-
missioner, 43 T.C. 743, 755-56 (1965), aff'd, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966) (no (D) reor-
ganization when the shareholder of transferor only owned 50% of the new corporation,
and a key employee of the transferor owned the other 50%); Gallagher v. Commissioner,
39 T.C. 144 (1962) (shareholders avoided reorganization treatment by shifting proprie-
tary interests to include key employees in the corporation, so the ownership percentage of
the transferor's active shareholders after the reincorporation amounted to only 73%).
But cf. Stanton v. United States, 512 F.2d 13, 17 (3d Cir. 1975), rev'g 371 F. Supp. 103
(E.D. Pa. 1974) (control requirement satisfied because wife who was not a shareholder of
the transferor became a 50% shareholder in the transferee; court deemed the wife's stock
a gift from her husband, the 100% shareholder of the transferor corporation).
85. Section 368(a)(2)(H) provides: "In the case of any transaction with respect to
which the requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 354(b)(1) are met, for
purposes of determining whether such transaction qualifies under subparagraph (D) of
paragraph (1), the term 'control' has the meaning given to such term by section 304(c)."
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tended this change to expand the definition of the non-divisive (D)
reorganization as a means of attacking the liquidation/
reincorporation transaction. 6 As a result, the (D) reorganization
provision became a stronger weapon for the government. At the
same time, however, this change injected an element of inconsis-
tency into the reorganization analysis because historically, the re-
organization rules were applied narrowly to a limited number of
legitimate business transactions.87
In particular, this change created a potential conflict with the
related common law continuity of proprietary interest doctrine.
This judicially created continuity of proprietary interest require-
ment, like the continutity of business enterprise requirement, must
be satisfied independently from the statute for the transaction to
qualify as a reorganization. This requirement is similar to the con-
trol requirement in the statute because it requires generally that the
transferor corporation or its shareholders retain a substantial pro-
prietary interest in the enterprise after the reorganization is
complete."8
This common law requirement now conflicts with the statutory
requirement, however, because the changes implemented by the
1984 Act allow the attribution rules to be used to satisfy the statu-
tory control requirement, although these rules cannot be used to
satisfy the common law continuity of interest requirement. In
other words, the indirect ownership of stock violates the common
law doctrine because the common law requirement still contains a
direct ownership test.89 This conflict between the statute and the
I.R.C § 368(a)(2)(H). This new definition invokes the rules of section 304(c), which in
turn invokes the attribution rules of section 318. The attribution rules generally require
that certain stock owned by other family members, partnerships, estates or trusts, be
attributed to a shareholder even though the shareholder does not actually own the stock
directly. See I.R.C. § 318.
86. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 847 (1984).
87. See Westin, supra note 17, at 1003 (reorganization provisions expanded beyond
their bounds to get at the liquidation/reincorporation transaction).
88. See B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 49, at 14.11. See also Southwest
Natural Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 332, 334 (5th Cir.) (no precise definition
exists for determining whether the continuity of interest requirement has been satisfied;
yet, the courts have determined that the interest must be a material interest, and it must
be represented by a direct ownership of stock in the transferee corporation), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 860 (1951).
89. See Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454, 458 (1938) (transferor corporation's
shareholders lacked continuity of interest because they received the parent's stock rather
than the subsidiary's); Groman v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82, 89-90 (1937) (no con-
tinuity of interest in a triangular transaction in which the transferors received stock in the
transferee corporation's parent in exchange for their property). The Supreme Court has
refused to permit indirect ownership of an interest to satisfy the common law continuity
1989]
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 21
common law requirement exists because of the inherent problems
associated with applying a reorganization provision in a way in
which it was never intended to apply.90 Congress intended the re-
organization provisions to provide relief for taxpayers in limited
situations, and the separate common law doctrines helped to define
the narrow situations in which the taxpayer could qualify for the
preferential treatment afforded by these provisions. 9'
More importantly an expanded definition of the (D) provision
also opened the door to taxpayers to circumvent one of the other
reorganization provisions. Specifically, this newly expanded (D)
provision could be used to circumvent the (C) reorganization pro-
vision.9 2 By definition, the (D) provision, like the (C) provision,
includes asset transfers. By relaxing the (D) control requirement,
the government has unintentionally provided reorganization treat-
ment to a whole set of transactions that do not meet the strict
eighty percent control requirement of section (C).9 3 Thus, a tax-
payer who would like to obtain reorganization treatment in an as-
of interest requirement. See Pinellas Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S.
462, 470 (1933).
90. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. The inconsistencies that arise with
respect to the common law requirement of a business purpose further support the misap-
plication of the reorganization provisions in the liquidation/reincorporation context.
This requirement, which originated in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), has not
been applied consistently when the reorganization provision has been invoked to cover
liquidation/reincorporation transactions. In some cases, the courts have considered the
existence of a business purpose important; in other cases, they have held that the require-
ment is not significant. See Breech v. United States, 439 F.2d 409, 411 (9th Cir. 1971)
(business purpose significant); Berghash v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 743, 749 (1965) (busi-
ness purpose significant), aff'd, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966). But cf Rose v. United
States, 640 F.2d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 1981) (business purpose insignificant in the liquida-
tion/reincorporation context). See also Gregory, 293 U.S. at 470 (the continuation of the
business and a business purpose were two separate requirements for reorganization treat-
ment). But see Liddon v Commissioner, 230 F.2d 304, 308 (6th Cir.) (transferee's contin-
uation of the business was itself sufficient to satisfy the business purpose requirement),
cert. denied, 352 U.S. 824 (1956). See also Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646, 650 (1st
Cir. 1949) (court rejected argument that a transaction was not a reorganization because it
lacked a corporate business purpose).
91. See generally Lynch, supra note 61, at .741-42; Nunnallee, supra note 17, at 1;
Westin, supra note 17, at 998-99.
92. Section 368(a)(1)(C) defines the (C) reorganization as follows:
[T]he acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a part of its
voting stock.., of substantially all of the properties of another corporation, but
in determining whether the exchange is solely for stock the assumption by the
acquiring corporation of a liability of the other, or the fact that property ac-
quired is subject to a liability, shall be disregarded.
I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C). See infra text accompanying note 143.
93. See I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(I)(C), 368(a)(2)(H).
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set transfer transaction can avoid the more exacting contours of
subsection (C).
This result illustrates one more problem associated with using
the (D) reorganization provision to combat the abuses of a transac-
tion to which the provision was never intended to apply. Although
the government's use of section (D) in the liquidation/reincorpora-
tion context has been understandable (taking into account the his-
tory of legislative inaction in this area), analysis demonstrates that
the use of this provision in the liquidation/reincorporation area has
created a double-edged sword.
IV. THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986
A. The Impact of the Act
The Tax Reform Act of 198694 increased the potential for abuse
under the (D) reorganization provision and, at the same time, re-
duced the usefulness of the provision as a weapon against the liqui-
dation/reincorporation transaction. The changes imposed by the
1986 Act were not aimed specifically at the (D) reorganization pro-
vision or at the abuses associated with the liquidation/reincorpora-
tion transaction, although two of the changes had a significant
impact on both.
The 1986 Act dramatically reduced the number of situations in
which the transaction can still be used to circumvent the normal
dividend distribution rules. Not surprisingly, these changes did
not solve all of the problems associated with the liquidation/
reincorporation transaction. Three limited situations still exist in
which taxpayers may use the transaction to obtain the preferential
tax treatment associated with an exchange distribution and to
avoid the normal dividend distribution rules.95 In the first situa-
tion, however, the usefulness of the reorganization provision as a
weapon for the government has been eliminated. In the other two
situations, the reorganization provision still fails to address all of
the abuses associated with the transaction.9 6 Indeed, the reorgani-
zation provision's reduced effectiveness as a weapon against the liq-
uidation/reincorporation transaction was also related to the
changes imposed by the 1986 Act.97
To illustrate this point, the two changes of the 1986 Act affecting
94. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514 § 701, 100 Stat. 2320 (1986). See
supra note 7 (brief discussion of the 1986 Act's impact on the treatment of capital gains).
95. See infra notes 109-31 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
97. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
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the liquidation/reincorporation transaction will be considered. In
addition, the new tax consequences associated with a normal divi-
dend distribution and a liquidation/reincorporation transaction
will be compared in light of several factors that can affect a partic-
ular transaction.9" The reorganization provision will then be ap-
plied in each of the three situations to demonstrate that it is not an
effective weapon for the government to use in combatting the
abuses of the liquidation/reincorporation transaction.99
B. The Changes Imposed by the Act
1. The Repeal of The Capital Gain Deduction
The first change of the 1986 Act that affected the liquidation/
reincorporation transaction was the repeal of the capital gain de-
duction. The repeal of this deduction eliminated the rate differen-
tial for taxing ordinary income and capital gains."°° This change
reduced the shareholder's incentive for structuring a distribution as
an exchange distribution rather than as a normal dividend distribu-
tion because capital gain and ordinary income are now taxed at the
same rate.' 0' Some incentive to structure the distribution as an ex-
change distribution in order to obtain the capital gain treatment of
the income still exists when shareholders have significant capital
losses. 0 12 In this situation, it is still important to have the distribu-
tion characterized as capital gain because capital losses can be off-
set only by capital gains. 0 3 In all other situations with respect to
all types of distributions, however, the characterization issue has
been equalized."°0
98. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 109-31 and accompanying text. One commentator suggests that
the remaining advantages associated with the liquidation/reincorporation transaction can
still be attacked under the reorganization provisions. See Krasner, supra note 17, at 895.
The situations described in Part C of this Article, however, will show that the reorganiza-
tion provision is no longer an effective weapon to combat the remaining abuses associated
with the liquidation/reincorporation transaction.
100. I.R.C. § 331(a). See also supra note 4.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See I.R.C. § 1211(a).
104. See supra note 7. The Jenkins-Archer Proposal, recently passed by the House,
proposes to restore a capital gains cut to the Code. This proposal, however, would not
affect the long term structure of the Code because it would only exist for a very limited
duration even if eventually passed by the Senate. See 44 TAX NOTES 1303 (1989).
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2. The Imposition Of A Corporate Level Tax: Repeal of The
General Utilities Doctrine
The second change of the 1986 Act impacting on the liquida-
tion/reincorporation transaction was the imposition of a corporate
level tax on liquidating and non-liquidating distributions of appre-
ciated assets."°5 This change also reduced the shareholder's incen-
tive for structuring a distribution as an exchange distribution
rather than as a normal dividend distribution. It did so because
the cost of the corporate level tax has the potential to negate the
benefit of stock basis recovery that is associated with an exchange
transaction. '06
This corporate level tax also is imposed on normal dividend dis-
tributions of appreciated property and thus has the potential to in-
crease the cost of a dividend distribution as well as an exchange
distribution. 0 7 In spite of the exchange treatment of a liquidation,
however, there is a larger potential to trigger a significant corpo-
rate level tax because all of the assets are distributed in a liquida-
tion. If a significant corporate level tax will be triggered by
liquidating the entire corporation, then it may make more sense for
shareholders to withdraw only the liquid assets in a dividend
distribution.
C. The Three Situations in which the Liquidation/
Reincorporation Transaction Can Still Be Used to
Circumvent the Normal Dividend Rules
The actual tax consequences of any transaction involving a dis-
tribution of a corporation's assets will depend on several factors,
including the shareholder's stock basis, the basis of the corporate
assets, the existence of any capital losses at the shareholder level,
105. See I.R.C. §§ 336(a), 311(b). These two sections directly repeal the General
Utilities doctrine. Section 336(a) provides that "gain or loss shall be recognized to a
liquidating corporation on the distribution of property in complete liquidation as if such
property were sold to the distributee at its fair market value." I.R.C. 336(a). See supra
note 41 (further discussion of the General Utilities doctrine).
106. The cost of the corporate level tax is another factor considered, when determin-
ing whether the stock basis recovery provided in a liquidation transaction is large enough
to limit the transaction's total amount of tax below the amount of tax that must be paid
in a dividend distribution.
107. Cf I.R.C. § 311(b) and I.R.C. § 336(a). Section 311(b) provides:
If a corporation distributes property ...to a shareholder in a distribution to
which subpart A applies, and the fair market value of such property exceeds its
adjusted basis . . . then gain shall be recognized to the distributing corporation
as if such property were sold to the distributee at its fair market value.
I.R.C. § 311(b).
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and the existence of any net operating losses at the corporate level.
The aforementioned changes in the 1986 Act had an impact on the
interplay of these factors in the liquidation/reincorporation type of
transaction. They also reduced the number of situations in which
the transaction could be used to circumvent the normal dividend
distribution rules.108 As previously indicated, however, the
changes did not completely eliminate all the situations in which the
transaction can still be used to avoid the dividend distribution
rules. In three limited situations, the transaction can still be used
as a tax avoidance.
1. High Basis Assets and High Basis Stock
The first situation, in which the liquidation/reincorporation
transaction still could be used by taxpayers to withdraw assets
from a corporation and to avoid the normal dividend distribution
rules, occurs when shareholders have a high basis in their stock
and the corporate assets have a high basis. In this situation, the
high basis in the stock would limit the amount of income recog-
nized by the shareholders in the liquidating distribution, minimiz-
ing any realized gain. 109 Because this distribution would be treated
as an exchange distribution, the shareholder's adjusted basis in the
stock would offset the amount of income realized in the distribu-
tion."0  The amount of income subject to tax at the shareholder
level would be kept to a minimum. Even though this income
would no longer be taxed at a preferential capital gain rate, the
benefit derived from the recovery of the high stock basis would
make the exchange distribution more attractive than a normal divi-
dend distribution because all of the income in a normal dividend
distribution would be subject to a shareholder level tax."'
The high basis in the corporate assets is important in this situa-
tion because of the new corporate level tax that is imposed on cor-
porate distributions of appreciated assets." I2 The high basis in the
corporate assets would have an effect similar to that of the high
basis in the stock because the corporate liquidation provision al-
108. For a discussion of the specific situations in which the liquidation/reincorpora-
tion transaction can still be used to obtain preferential tax treatment, see infra notes 109-
31 and accompanying text.
109. Id.
110. See I.R.C. § 331(a).
111. Cf. I.R.C. § 3 3 1(a) and § 301(a).
112. In either type of distribution of appreciated assets, the amount of gain subject to
tax is equal to the difference between the fair market value of the asset distributed and the
adjusted basis of the asset. I.R.C. §§ 31 1(b), 336(a).
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lows a similar offset of the amount realized in the distribution for
the adjusted basis in assets.' As a result, the amount of tax im-
posed at both the corporate and shareholder levels in the exchange
distribution could be kept to a level below the amount of tax that
would be imposed on a normal dividend distribution of just the
liquid assets. 4 Under these circumstances, it would make more
sense for the shareholders to liquidate the entire corporation to ob-
tain the liquid assets rather than to withdraw only the liquid assets
as a dividend." 5
The reorganization provision is no longer useful for the govern-
ment as a weapon against the abuse of the transaction under this
set of circumstances. A section 356 boot distribution in this situa-
tion now receives the same or even better treatment than the ex-
change distribution. The boot distribution receives a similar offset
by the stock basis to limit the amount of income recognized at the
shareholder level."1 6 The high basis in the shareholder's stock off-
sets the amount of income recognized by the shareholder in exactly
the same way it does in an exchange transaction.' 17 At the corpo-
rate level, the reorganization rules provide for complete nonrecog-
nition, so no corporate level tax is imposed on the transaction. 1' 8
Thus, under this set of circumstances, the liquidation/reincorpora-
tion transaction still could be used to circumvent the normal divi-
dend distribution rules. The net result is that the (D) provision
would produce the same, if not better, results for the taxpayer." 9
2. Capital Losses and a Small Corporate Level Tax
The second situation, which may still permit taxpayers to cir-
113. See I.R.C. § 336(a).
114. This result would not occur, however, in a dividend distribution because the
dividend rules do not allow the shareholder to use stock basis to offset the amount of
income received in the dividend distribution. See I.R.C. § 301.
115. This same result occurs even if the amount of liquid assets to be withdrawn is
fairly small because the high basis in the stock and the assets significantly limits the
amount of income subject to tax below the amount of liquid assets that would be subject
to tax under the dividend rules if the transaction were structured as a normal dividend
distribution rather than as an exchange distribution.
116. See I.R.C. § 356(a).
117. Cf I.R.C. §§ 356(a), 331(a).
118. See I.R.C. § 361(a).
119. Under these circumstances if the basis in the corporate assets equalled their fair
market value, the results of a liquidation/reincorporation transaction would be the same
under the reorganization provision. In the majority of cases in which the basis in the
corporate assets is high, but not equal to fair market value, treating the transaction as a
reorganization would provide more preferential tax treatment for the taxpayer because
the nonrecognition treatment provided by the reorganization provision would completely
shelter all of the corporate level tax. Cf I.R.C. §§ 336(a) and 361(a).
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cumvent the normal dividend rules by using the liquidation/
reincorporation transaction, occurs when the shareholders have
significant capital losses that can be used to offset the capital gain
recognized at the shareholder level. 120 This situation also requires
a high basis in the corporate assets which can be used to offset the
corporate level gain realized in the exchange distribution. The
benefits associated with this situation can only be achieved if the
corporate level tax can be kept below the total amount of tax that
would have to be paid by the shareholders in a dividend distribu-
tion of the liquid assets. 21 The liquidation/reincorporation trans-
action will be useful here only if the corporate level tax is kept to a
minimum so that it will not negate the benefits associated with the
offset of the shareholder level gain provided by the capital losses.
In contrast to the first situation, however, the government still
could use the reorganization provision to eliminate one of the
abuses of the transaction in this situation. The government could
attack the abuse associated with the offset provided by the share-
holder's capital losses by recharacterizing the distribution as ordi-
nary income under section 356(a). 122  This would render the
shareholder's capital losses useless. 123
In addition, the abuse of a step-up in the basis of the reincorpo-
rated assets might be attacked by applying the reorganization pro-
vision in this situation. This abuse would exist, however, only if a
net operating loss offset a significant corporate level gain.124 In this
situation, if the transaction were not treated as a reorganization,
the corporate assets would receive a step-up in basis. 125 If the reor-
ganization provision applied, on the other hand, then the corporate
level gain would be afforded nonrecognition treatment, and the as-
120. See I.R.C. § 1211(a).
121. If the corporate level tax will be increased significantly by distributing all of the
corporate assets, then it may not make sense to liquidate, even though the shareholder
level tax could be avoided because of the offset provided by the capital losses. A net
operating loss could also be used to offset the corporate level tax instead of a high basis in
the corporate assets. See infra text accompanying notes 128-31.
122. See supra note 11.
123. See I.R.C. §§ 356(a)(2), 121 l(a). If a net operating loss were used in this situa-
tion to offset the corporate level gain, instead of a high basis in the corporate assets, then
the reorganization provision would allow the government to attack the step-up in basis
achieved by the liquidation transaction. See infra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.
124. If a high basis in the corporate assets offset the corporate level gain, then no
potential to significantly step-up the assets' basis would exist.
125. See I.R.C. § 334(a). Under section 334(a), the step-up in basis occurs upon liq-
uidation because gain is recognized in the exchange transaction. Accordingly, the basis
of property in the hands of the distributee is the fair market value of such property at the
time of the distribution. Id. Upon reincorporation, the corporation takes a transfer basis
in the assets. Id. at § 351(a).
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sets would not receive a step-up in basis. 126 The reorganization
provision could not reach one benefit derived by the taxpayer in
the liquidation/reincorporation transaction: the benefit associated
with the recovery of the shareholder's stock basis. This benefit is
unreachable because both the boot distribution rules and the ex-
change distribution rules allow the same type of offset. 27
3. Net Operating Losses and High Basis Stock
The third situation in which the liquidation/reincorporation
transaction still could be used by taxpayers to circumvent the divi-
dend distribution rules occurs when the shareholders have a high
stock basis to limit the amount of income at the shareholder level,
and the corporation has a net operating loss at the corporate level
to offset the amount of gain realized at the corporate level. In this
situation, the exchange distribution provides more favorable tax
treatment than a dividend distribution because the recovery of the
stock's high basis reduces the amount of income subject to tax be-
low the amount of liquid assets that would be subject to tax in a
dividend distribution.121 In addition, the net operating loss at the
corporate level offsets any gain realized upon liquidation. 29 If the
corporate level gain is significant, then the corporate assets will
receive a significant step-up in basis so that upon reincorporation,
future depreciation deductions may flow from the increased basis
and generate additional tax savings. 130
The step-up in basis provides a significant benefit in this situa-
tion because the step-up occurs even though the offset provided by
the net operating loss avoids the corporate level tax. This benefit
does not accrue if the reorganization provision is applied to the
transaction because the corporate level gain is sheltered by nonrec-
ognition treatment, thus preventing a resulting step-up in basis.13 '
126. See I.R.C. §§ 361(a), 362(a).
127. See I.R.C. §§ 356(a), 33 1(a). This problem existed before the 1986 Act, and the
reorganization provisions have never adequately addressed it.
128. See I.R.C. § 331(a).
129. See I.R.C. § 336(a).
130. The step-up in basis will not be significant, however, if the assets already have a
high basis prior to the liquidation/reincorporation transaction.
131. I.R.C. § 362(a).
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V. REPEAL OF THE (D) REORGANIZATION PROVISION
A. The (D) Reorganization Provision In The Liquidation!
Reincorporation Context
1. An Ineffective Weapon For The Government
The changes implemented by the 1986 Act curtailed the contin-
ued usefulness of the (D) reorganization provision with respect to
the abuses of the liquidation/reincorporation transaction. The re-
duction in the number of situations in which the transaction can
still be used affected this result. Yet, the reorganization provision
has lost much of its vitality even in the limited situations in which
the transaction can be used. 132
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, the government still can
use the reorganization provision to attack the abuses of the liquida-
tion/reincorporation transaction in only two remaining situa-
tions. 33 Yet, even in these two very limited situations, the
reorganization provision does not address all of the abuses associ-
ated with the transaction.1 34 For example, the dividend within
gain limitation of section 356(a) provides the biggest downfall to
applying the reorganization provision to the liquidation/
reincorporation transaction. The liquidation provision provides
this similar gain limitation mechanism, which allows taxpayers to
use their stock basis to offset the amount of income recognized in a
reorganization transaction.' 35 Although the reorganization provi-
sion can still combat part of the abuse, the most serious problem
regarding the inclusion of the correct amount of income in the dis-
tribution remains unresolved. 36
2. The Taxpayers Use Of The (D) Provision Against
The Government
The other significant problem associated with the (D) reorgani-
zation provision is that now it can be used by taxpayers against the
government in situations unintended by Congress. This problem
began in 1984 when Congress reduced the control requirement for
132. See supra notes 108-31 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 120-31 and accompanying text.
134. Id.
135. Cf I.R.C. §§ 356(a) and 331(a).
136. Because the characterization issue has been equalized with respect to all types of
distribution, except in cases involving capital losses, today the major abuse associated
with the liquidation/reincorporation transaction is the limitation on the amount of in-
come included in the distribution.
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non-divisive (D) reorganizations.-3 This amended definition of
control expanded the (D) provision's scope so that the government
could use the provision more effectively as a weapon against abu-
sive liquidation/reincorporation transactions. 138 At the same time,
however, this change opened the door for taxpayers to circumvent
the restrictive eighty percent boot consideration rule in the type
(C) reorganization provision because the (D) provision, which only
requires at least fifty percent control, covers many of the same as-
set transfers as the (C) provision. Essentially, a taxpayer can now
more easily tailor an acquisitive transaction as a reorganization
and avoid the more exacting requirements of the (C) provision.13 9
The changes in the 1986 Act that impacted on the liquidation/
reincorporation transaction reversed the arguments in the liquida-
tion/reincorporation context.' ° This role reversal compels the
taxpayer to argue for reorganization treatment and the government
to argue that the transaction is taxable. This bizarre result will
occur in the first situation discussed above when shareholders want
to withdraw liquid assets from a corporation.' Instead of with-
drawing the assets in a normal dividend distribution, they will
structure the transaction as a (D) reorganization to take advantage
of the dividend within gain limitation provided by the boot distri-
bution rules while avoiding the imposition of a corporate level tax.
The government obviously would prefer to treat this transaction as
a taxable one to collect the corporate level tax. The taxpayer, how-
ever, has the benefit of a large body of law, previously advanced by
the government, that supports the application of the reorganization
provision to this type of transaction. 142
The taxpayers use of the (D) reorganization provision in this sit-
uation circumvents the normal dividend distribution rules. More-
over, as previously noted, it also circumvents the type (C)
reorganization because the taxpayers can take advantage of the re-
duced control requirement in the (D) provision. 43 This result is
137. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. See also I.R.C. 368(a)(1)(A). The
type (A) reorganization provision provides nonrecognition treatment for statutory merg-
ers and has always been more liberal than the type (C) reorganization. The statutory
merger provision is unique, however, because it is designed to cover transactions that are
defined under state law. The other reorganization provisions cover transactions that are
defined solely by the statute itself.
140. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
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particularly disturbing because Congress did not originally intend
the (D) provision to apply at all to non-divisive reorganizations. 44
As it stands now, section 368(a)(1)(D) provides a way for taxpay-
ers to circumvent the dividend distribution rules as well as the
other non-divisive reorganization provision that applies to asset
transfers.
This problem could be eliminated by repealing the (D) provi-
sion. Repeal also would eliminate the inconsistency that has devel-
oped as result of the (D) provision's application in a manner
unintended by Congress. Before the repeal can take place, how-
ever, it must be determined that the provision serves no other use-
ful purpose.
B. Other Purposes Of The (D) Provision
The one transaction originally intended to be covered by the (D)
reorganization provision was the divisive type of transaction. 4 5
Divisive transactions are still within the scope of the (D) reorgani-
zation provision, but now other independent provisions of the
Code provide the same tax treatment for these types of transac-
tions. 46 Thus, repeal of the (D) reorganization provision would
have no significant effect.
The (D) provision's only other legitimate purpose would be to
address some of the remaining abuses associated with the liquida-
tion/reincorporation transaction. As previously indicated, how-
ever, the (D) provision does not address all of the abuses associated
with the transaction even in the two limited situations in which it is
partially helpful."'
The situations in which the liquidation/reincorporation transac-
tion still can be used to circumvent the dividend distribution rules
could be dealt with more effectively by a rule dealing specifically
144. See supra note 64.
145. Id. This type of transaction is usually in the form of a spin-off, split-off, or split-
up.
146. The 1954 Code effectively separated the divisive transaction from the scope of
the reorganization provision, but it always remained within the language of section
368(a)(1)(D). If this section is repealed, the divisive reorganization can obtain the same
nonrecognition treatment from section 355 alone or in conjunction with section 351.
Nonrecognition at the shareholder level is not dependent upon a reorganization. See
I.R.C. § 355(a)(2)(C). At the corporate level, if section 355 applies, section 355(c) per-
mits nonrecognition by exempting the transaction from section 311(b). See I.R.C.
§ 355(c)(2). A discussion concerning these nonrecognition provisions is beyond the scope
of this Article as is a discussion concerning the other reorganization provisions of the
Code. For a discussion of the divisive type of transaction, see Simon & Simmons, The
Future of Section 355, 40 TAX NOTES 291 (1988).
147. See supra notes 119-31.
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with those three, very limited situations.148 The necessity of such a
rule would depend upon the frequency of these situations and the
potential for significant abuse. A rule could prove superior to the
reorganization provision because the latter has the potential to
cause more problems than it can resolve. 49
VI. CONCLUSION
The 1986 Act significantly changed the role of the (D) reorgani-
zation provision. Prior to 1986, the (D) provision served primarily
as a weapon for the government in combatting the abuses of the
liquidation/reincorporation transaction. In 1986, this role was al-
tered because the imposition of a corporate level tax on corporate
distributions and the repeal of the capital gain deduction changed
the tax consequences associated with the three different types of
corporate distributions.
Specifically, these changes reduced the preferential tax treatment
of the exchange distribution associated with the liquidation/
reincorporation transaction. The exchange type of distribution is
less attractive under the new law because both the imposition of
the corporate level tax and the repeal of the capital gain deduction
make the distribution more expensive than it was in the past. Con-
sequently, fewer situations now exist in which the liquidation/
148. One commentator recently suggested several different ways to address the liqui-
dation/reincorporation transaction outside of the reorganization provisions. See Westin,
supra note 17, at 1007. These proposals could be restricted further to apply only in the
four limited situations in which there is potential for abuse. See also Nunnallee, supra
note 17, at 39. Nunnallee proposes a method to deal with the liquidation/reincorporation
abuses outside of the reorganization provisions. His proposal suggests that distributions
of appreciated property in a reincorporation transaction be taxed under section 301 so
that these distributions would receive the same tax treatment as similar distributions
made in redemption transactions and stock sale transactions under section 304. Id. The
proposal does not, however, contain a rule that would determine when the dividend rules
should apply and when liquidation rules should apply. Again, this type of rule could be
restricted to the four limited situations in which there is still a potential for abuse.
149. The Senate Finance Committee's Subchapter C Revision Act of 1985 adopted a
similar approach. The proposal in this Act effectively eliminated the (D) reorganization
provision and altered the complete structure of the reorganization provisions so that the
tax consequences at the corporate and shareholder levels were made completely in-
dependent of one another. At the corporate level, nonrecognition treatment was made
dependent on meeting the requirements of a qualified acquisition of assets or stock; non-
recognition treatment at the shareholder level was dependent upon the receipt of stock as
consideration in the transaction. Any boot received by shareholders in a "qualifying ac-
quisition" was treated as a dividend, and there was no dividend within gain limitation to
limit the amount of income recognized in the transaction. See The Subchapter C Revision
Act of 1985, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
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reincorporation transaction can be used by taxpayers to circum-
vent the normal dividend distribution rules.
The reorganization transaction, on the other hand, is more at-
tractive under the new law because the nonrecognition treatment
provided by the reorganization provision shelters the corporate
level tax. As a result, more situations will now arise in which tax-
payers will want to use the reorganization provision to circumvent
the normal dividend distribution rules and the exchange distribu-
tion rules.
The possibility of taxpayers using the (D) provision to avoid the
normal dividend distribution rules in non-divisive transactions is
particularly disturbing because the (D) reorganization provision
was originally drafted to cover divisive types of transaction and
was not intended to apply to non-divisive types of transactions.
Since 1954, however, the divisive type of transaction has been effec-
tively separated from the scope of the provision while treatment of
the non-divisive transaction under the provision has been ex-
panded. The expanded treatment of the non-divisive transaction
occurred in 1984 so the provision could be used more effectively as
a weapon by the government to attack the non-divisive liquida-
tion/reincorporation transaction. Now, however, the expanded
version of the (D) provision makes it easier for taxpayers to use in
situations in which it was never intended to apply.
The repeal of the (D) provision would eliminate the potential for
circumventing the other distribution rules in the Code and could
do so without affecting the treatment of the divisive transaction
currently within the provision's scope. The divisive type of trans-
action could be handled by applying other independent provisions
of the Code. The few remaining abuses of the liquidation/
reincorporation transaction could be addressed under a specific
rule designed to apply in the three limited situations in which the
transaction still may be used.
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